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In the integration of the two Germanies, two countries are being united which
differed widely in their institutional and constitutional arrangements as well as in
their monetary systems and real economic conditions. Integration therefore means
- harmonization of the institutional systems,
- introduction of a common currency and a unified monetary policy, and
- adjustment in the real economies.
In the process of integration, these three aspects of institutional harmonization,
establishing a single monetary policy and bringing the real economic conditions
closer to each other will overlap.
The final state of the integration process is a fully integrated economic union.
In the commodity markets, the law of one price will govern for tradeables. The
prices for non-tradeables such as housing and some services will differ among re-
gions. In the factor markets, one price will prevail for any given factor that is
completely mobile. Interest rates and the marginal productivity of capital will be
identical everywhere. However, prices of immobile factors of production such as
land and the environment will differ from region to region. Labor will be in an
intermediate position. Insofar as labor is completely mobile, real wages tend to
equalize; they can, however, be different when the costs of living vary over
space. When labor is only partly mobile and when preferences for specific locations
exist, real wages may be more differentiated. On the monetary side, there will be
only one currency whose value is determined by the money supply of one central
bank. The social security systems will be harmonized. The state, including the
provision of public goods and the tax system, will be homogeneous, notwithstand-
ing federal elements. Finally, the firms and the sectorial structure in the economic
union will have adjusted to the new conditions, and East Germany will have caught
up in income per head.
The author appreciates comments on sections of this paper from Alfred Boss,
Bert Hofman, Rolf J. Langhammer, Michael Rauscher, Birgit Sander and
Klaus-Dieter Schmidt. This report is based on information available as of
September 1, 1990. It is an update and an expansion of an earlier report from
May 1990. New information on economic conditions, policy decisions and changes
in the points of view of the policy makers due to new moods in the population
may affect the underlying assumptions of the analysis.2. The Starting Point
The Initial Situation
The starting point of the integration process can be described by the follow-
ing basic facts (Table 1):
(i) Labor productivity in the German Demokratic Republic (GDR) prior to July 1,
1990, is estimated at one-third of the West German productivity [ Siebert,
1989b; 1990a; Siebert, Schmieding, 1990]. On the basis of 1983 data, pro-
ductivity in the GDR was originally put at roughly 50 percent of the West
German level [ DIW, 1987]. In the latter study, productivity was measured
for the GDR before the wall came down. The poor quality of GDR commodi-
ties, which in many cases cannot compete on the international market, was
not taken into account. The trade structure was distorted towards the
COMECON. Moreover, environmental costs of production were not taken into
consideration, so that productivity was lower than expressed in the num-
bers. This holds for environmental damages of actual production as well as
for vintage damages; especially as concerns the generation of electricity
(brown coal and atomic plants), the chemical industry, the steel industry
and, in part, other sectors such as machinery and transportation equipment.
Due to rising environmental prices, energy costs are distorted as well. The
internalization of environmental and energy costs acts like an oil price shock
suppressing productivity.
As a rough indicator of productivity, the "foreign currency coefficient"
may be used. It is defined as costs in GDR-Marks necessary to earn one
unit of D-Mark in the trade with the West. This coefficient, which is influ-
enced of course by a distorted price structure, rose from 2.4 (1980) to 2.9
(1985) and 4.4 (1988), indicating a real depreciation of the GDR-Mark and a
loss in productivity in the eighties.
(ii) Differences in productivity are reflected in income differences. In 1989, the
average wage income in the whole economy was M 1230 in the GDR and DM
3970 in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
(iii) Differences in the income situation were the most important reason for migra-
tion. In 1989, about 340000 inhabitants left the GDR; in the first three
Meanwhile DIW [ 1990a] estimates that the productivity gap is somewhat larger






































































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [a]; Sachverstandigenrat [1990]; Statistisches Bun-
desamt [1989a].
months of 1990, the GDR lost approximately 150000 inhabitants.
(iv) The present situation is also characterized by inadequate environmental qual-
ity, unsatisfactory housing and gaps in medical care.
Low Productivity Level
The low level of productivity in East Germany has a number of causes:
- The capital stock in industry is largely obsolete both from the production and
the demand side. Outdated technologies are used, and output is not competitive.
- Social overhead capital in transportation and communication is deficient.
- Industry is inefficient because each branch has been organized as a well protect-
ed monopoly with clearly segmented markets. The monopolies were not checked
by competition. Ironically, the industrial structure is the result of a speciali-
zation philosophy similar to the strategic trade policy now being discussed in the
international economics literature.
Prior to the election on March 18, 1990, about 2000 inhabitants left per day, in
mid April under 500.- Central planning has proved to be a failure because this system does not provide
the right incentives and because it does not signal the correct information on
scarcity.
How to Increase Productivity
The core of the problem is the low productivity in the GDR. A causal therapy
must start from this point and increase productivity. This can be done in two
ways:
(i) Labor productivity can be raised by an increase in capital, shifting the mar-
ginal productivity of labor curve upward. New capital embodies new technical
knowledge. With an increase in productivity, wages can rise. Consequently,
for an improvement to occur capital has to flow into East Germany. In a cur-
rency union, both capital and labor are mobile. In the actual case of the two
Germanies, capital alone should do the adjustment job, so that people do not
have to migrate. Thus, capital must flow into East Germany at such a high
speed and with such a great volume that people have no incentive to move.
(ii) Productivity will also be increased by giving up central planning and intro-
ducing the social market economy. Bottlenecks will disappear quickly. Firms
will no longer need large inventories in order to reduce the risk of nondeliv-
ery of essential inputs. They will then be able to rely on punctual deliveries,
thus taking advantage of the division of labor among firms. New and small
firms will raise productivity. In the short and medium run, the reorganization




In the transition of any socialist economy to a market economy institutional
reforms imply
- the abandonment of central planning and the introduction of the market mechan-
ism, the determination of prices based on scarcities and world market prices to-
gether with the immediate abolishment of subsidies for tradeables (i.e., consumer
goods) and of the government's foreign trade monopoly,- the introduction of private property rights including ownership of land and
firms,
- the privatization of state-owned firms, their reorganization and exposure to com-
petition,
- the establishment of a two-tier banking system with private banks, of a capital
market to allocate savings to the most productive investments, and of a stock
exchange to evaluate assets and to control managers,
- the development of a new tax system, the design of a new social security system
that includes unemployment insurance, and the specifying of a new arrangement
for the labor market, including a definition of the role of trade unions.
Adopting the West German Institutions
Whereas other centrally planned economies have to create the institutional set-
ting for a market system from scratch, the GDR had the option of simply taking
over the institutional arrangement of the West German system, including the con-
stitution, the taxation system, governmental structure including the federal sys-
tem, social security and all the laws applying to the economy. This institutional
integration was laid down in a "Staatsvertrag", which stipulated the necessary
changes in the laws of the GDR, including the non-applicability of the GDR consti-
tution in certain areas. The Staatsvertrag implied the introduction of the market
economy into the GDR as of July 1, 1990.
A large part of institutional integration was accomplished in one stroke; but
in some areas, the implementation of institutions will take time. This, for instance,
is the case in creating a federal structure in the GDR, for which the old "Lander"
will have to be revived and new governmental structures will have to be created.
Organizing an internal revenue service and applying the West German tax system
will also require a transitional period.
For the social security system, a transitional phase is accorded in which old
age pensions, unemployment benefits and welfare payments differ between the two
Germanies. In principle, the structure of the West German social security system is
applied. Pensions are determined on the basis of past and actual wages in East
Germany, unemployment benefits are linked to the previous wage income, and other
forms of social security take into account the cost of living (e.g., rents for hous-
ing) in different areas. The level of social security payments will thus be different
between East and West Germany as long as wages differ. A higher benefit levelwould imply higher minimum or reservation wages, thus deteriorating East German
firms' competitiveness and increasing unemployment even more.
4. Monetary Integration
The Monetary Options
There were two options for monetary integration: the transitional and the in-
stant approach. From an economist's point of view, the transitional approach with
two currencies, both possibly managed by the Bundesbank in Frankfurt, would
have had the advantage of
- using the exchange rate as a shock absorber for the East German firms, thus
giving them competitiveness temporarily,
- easing the transitional difficulties involved in adapting the social security system
and in adjusting wages,
- delegating the conversion of debt, liabilities and wages to the market exchange
rate prevailing at the end of the transitional period, and uncoupling the GDR-
Mark from the European Monetary System (EMS) for the transitional period.
From the politician's point of view, there may not have been enough time
available for a transitional solution. Moreover, two currencies may not have
stopped the emigration of people. The discussion of all the problems associated
with the monetary integration focused on the choice of the conversion rate and on
the conditions for conversion. The two central economic issues were the impact of
conversion on the price level stability in the new currency area and on the com-
petitiveness of East German firms. Moreover, there was the issue to what extent
the conversion would influence government transfers in the future. Last but not
least, the conversion was influenced by the political expectations of the people in
the GDR.
Impact on Monetary Aggregates
According to the philosophy of a capacity-oriented monetary policy, the money
supply should grow with the increase in production capacity in order to ensure
price level stability. Monetary integration implies that the production capacity of
East Germany is added to that of West Germany (indicated by the GNP of DM 2250
bill, in 1989 when overall capacity was highly utilized), so that the money-supplycorridor can shift upward. The production capacity of the GDR is estimated at 10
percent of West Germany's. Consequently, the money supply in the narrow defi-
nition, Ml, (DM 421 bill., May 1990) could have increased by DM 42 bill. The
larger money supply, M3, (DM 1222 bill. , May 1990) could have increased by DM
122 bill.
Monetary assets in the GDR in the sense of M3 amounted to M 263. 5 bill, as of
May 31, 1990 (coins and notes, M 13.6 bill.; deposits of domestic non-banks, M
249.9 bill, of which demand and savings deposits, M 165.6 bill., insurance con-
tracts, M 14.2 bill. , and deposits of firms at the GDR central bank, M 57 bill. )
(Table 2).
Financial assets were converted at the rate of 2:1, except for a maximum of M
4000 per head (M 6000 for people older than 59 and M 2000 for those under 15) at
the fate of 1:1. The Bundesbank claims that the average conversion rate is 1.8:1
[Deutsche Bundesbank, a]. This implies an increase in M3 of roughly DM 160 bill.
(M 64 bill, at the rate of 1:1, the difference between M 263.5 bill, (deposits plus
notes and coins) and 64 bill., namely M 199.5 bill., at the rate of 2:1). This
would seem to exceed the permissible limit for M3 of DM 122 bill, by DM 38 bill.
With part of the financial assets going into bonds and other interest-bearing
forms, the overall increase in M3 should be in line with the monetary target. A
more difficult issue is that, technically, the converted M3 aggregate cannot be dis-
tinguished from Ml if the citizens of the GDR decide to transform M3 assets into
Ml assets. There is no time structure for the M3 assets. Thus one will have to
keep a close eye on the development of Ml.
Conversion and the Competitiveness of Firms
Whereas financial stock variables were converted at 1.8: 1, flow variables like
wages, pensions etc. were transformed at the rate of 1: 1. This implies that the
conversion wage basically is at one third of the West German level. Meanwhile, we
have seen wage increases in some sectors of 25-30 percent. Naturally, the conver-
sion rate affects the competitiveness of the East German firms. For tradeables, the
The net material product of the GDR is M 273. 5-bill. (1989). This number is dis-
torted. Since the population in the GDR is only 26 percent as large as West Ger-
many's population, the GDR would have a GNP of DM 600 bill, if it produced at
the West German level of productivity. At a level of only one-third of the West
German level, its GNP would amount to roughly DM 200 bill. The participation
rate in the GDR being higher than in West Germany, this figure will be slightly
higher. Consequently, the GNP of the GDR can be put at roughly 10 percent of
West Germany's.10
Table 2 - Consolidated Balance Sheet of the GDR Banking System as of May 31,
1990
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c) Provisions for spe-
cific exchange rates










































Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [a].
law of one price applies in a currency union. This means that East German firms
will have to compete with West German firms as well as internationally - given their
present productivity and cost situation without having the advantage of a variable
exchange rate.
One strategy in the conversion of the wage rates would have been to leave wage
setting to the market, similar to the way prices for tradeables are specified by
market forces. Another approach by some would have been to use a modest con-11
The competitiveness of East German firms will also be affected by the conver-
sion of firms' gross debt with the central bank (M 231.7 bill. ). Even at the con-
version rate of 2: 1, the competitiveness of firms will be affected. With different
rates of conversion being applied for savings and for debts, equalization claims
have to be established. These claims will be defined against the assets of the
GDR, but they may eventually be an expenditure item in the West German budget.
The conversion rate defines the amount of public transfers needed to correct
"structural" problems. In a scenario where one can use the exchange rate as a
shock absorber for GDR industry, the political demand for government transfers
will be relatively low. In a scenario of a quick monetary union with a favorable
rate to the GDR saver and wage earner, the lacking competitiveness of East Ger-
man industry will manifest itself in greater structural problems, including unem-
ployment, and a more extended transfer scheme will be required. Moreover, the
equalization claims arising from the different conversion rates for savings and
debts might be a burden on the budget of the political union.
5. Real Economic Integration
Institutional and monetary integration will influence the economic decisions of
households and firms which in turn will bring about economic integration in the
real sphere of the economy. From an allocation point of view, the economic inte-
gration of the two Germanies can be viewed as the integration of two economies
which have different sectorial structures and which are at different levels of
development. More specifically, economic integration can be interpreted as the
addition of qualified labor, land and a partially obsolete capital stock to the West
German economy. Eventually the capital stock per worker in the area of the GDR
will reach the West German level and the economic structure will tend to equalize.
The paradigm to be applied for the analysis of the integration process has to
include the following four elements:
version wage as a floor from which market forces would find the equilibrium
wage, including the appropriate wage structure among firms, sectors, regions
and occupations. Such an approach would have allowed a quick differentiation in
the wage structure. Moreover, wages could have increased quickly together with
the productivity gains; wages would also have been increased to attract labor
into new firms (wage drift). Using a cautious conversion wage as a floor would
have come close to a market process of wage formation.12
(i) From the point of view of integration theory, two economies merge and ex-
ploit comparative advantages. Trade will be created and diverted. In the
context of the Helpman-Krugman approach [1985], economies of scale and
product qualities influencing a firm's market share play a role.
(ii) Mobility of capital will be an important vehicle of adjustment, which implies
frequent changes in comparative advantage in the transitional period. Capital
mobility will come in all forms, such as portfolio capital, direct investment,
mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures. Mobility of labor is relevant as
well because migration may increase if living conditions (including employ-
ment opportunities) are too divergent.
(iii) Starting at. a low productivity level and a largely obsolete capital stock
there will be a Schumpeterian growth process fuelled by capital and techno-
logy transfer, the founding of new firms and an organizational restructuring
of industry.
(iv) Finally, the adjustment process may not be steered by markets but may be
affected by the political economy of transition.
a. The Integration Effect
Capital
The capital stock of GDR industry is largely obsolete. This is due to a num-
ber of reasons. First, the capital goods (equipment and buildings) are old. Accor-
ding to unofficial sources, 76 percent of the equipment in industry is older than 5
2
years, 54.9 percent older than 10 years, and 21. 1 percent older than 20 years.
In the machine producing industry, 56.3 percent of the equipment is older than 10
years. Second, the capital stock is geared towards distorted environmental and
energy costs. Vintage damages represent a high burden on the future for specific
industries. Moreover, production and the capital stock were oriented to the
1 See also Institut fur Internationale Politik und Wirtschaft [1990, p. 8] which
claims that the GDR sectors are characterized by a low labor productivity and a
high capital stock per employee, which implies inefficiency.
2
Slightly different data are given by the Institut fur Internationale Politik und
Wirtschaft [1990, Table 7]. For infrastructure capital, the figures are even
worse: 45. 1 percent of the equipment in the postal and communication services is
older than 20 years.13
COMECON, an external market with many distortions; hence many products cannot
compete internationally because of their poor quality.
A crude procedure is to apply the West German capital/output coefficient of
2. 1 for the goods-producing sectors (mining, manufacturing, construction, and
electricity, gas and water), and of 4.6 for the total economy (including infrastruc-
ture). Assuming that East Germany will eventually produce with the same labor
productivity and a similar sectorial structure, the East German capital stock can be
adjusted by correcting the capital stock of the Federal Republic by the GDR popu-
lation which is only 26 percent of the population in the Federal Republic (Table
3). Neglecting the growth process and using 1989 data, the comparable East Ger-





































(a) Calculated as 26 percent of the West German capital stock in 1989. - (b) In-
cluding goods-producing crafts. - (c) Construction and equipment (not land), es-
timated yearly averages at replacement costs. - (d) Evaluated at replacement






























Source: Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989]; Statistisches Bundesamt [1989b]; own
estimates.14
man capital stock for 1989 would be DM 498 bill. (FRG: DM 1917 bill. ) for the
goods-producing sectors, DM 1148 bill. (FRG: DM 4416 bill. ) for all enterprises
(not including housing), for housing DM 1109 bill. (FRG: DM 4265 bill. ), and DM
2789 bill. (FRG: DM 10725 bill. ) for the total economy. For the public infrastruc-
ture the figure is DM 531 bill. (FRG: DM 2044 bill. ). Apparently, this is a back-
of-the-envelope calculation, representing an upper bound of the capital require-
ment. In order to determine the actual capital requirement, it has to be estimated
to what extent the existing capital stock is obsolete. If 50 percent of the stock can
be used, the capital requirement for all firms would amount to DM 574 bill. , in the
extreme case of zero percent, the figure will be double this. It seems that invest-
ment of this size can be undertaken over a series of years and be financed by
private capital.
In the adjustment process, capital and technology will be transferred to the
GDR, with the transfer of technology shifting the marginal capital productivity
curve for the GDR, F * in Figure 1, upward over time. The total German capital













Assuming a capital requirement of DM 1148 bill, (complete obsoleteness), over a
ten-year period annual investment for all enterprises must be DM 114. 8 bill.15
stock is indicated by OO* in the initial situation, with the West German capital
stock denoted by ON and the East German capital stock by NO*. Initially, the two
capital markets are segmented and the marginal capital productivity in the GDR is
lower (point A* relative to A). Point A indicates the given world interest rate. In
the intermediate situation (point M), the real interest rate may be higher than
initially and the world interest rate may have been driven up. In the long-run
equilibrium (point A), the marginal capital productivities in the GDR and the FRG
will be equated. Over time, capital will have flowed from the West (including the
western world) to the GDR, increasing the capital stock of the GDR by 0*0*'.
Labor
Labor mobility will react to differences in net wages and to employment oppor-
tunities. With the exchange rate no longer available to improve the competitiveness
of East German firms, the wage rate should take over the function of giving East
Germany a temporary comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries. How-
ever, one has to recognize some mechanisms that reduce the wage differential.
Since highly skilled workers are rather mobile, their wages cannot' differ too much
between East and West Germany. Commuters along the previous border will raise
the wage in the western parts of the former GDR; this also holds for Berlin. Firms
in the service sector in East Germany, such as banks and insurance companies,
seem to pay the same wage to employees regardless of whether they come from East
Germany or West Germany. Finally, trade unions will push for high wage increa-
ses. Thus, a favorable labor endowment at low wages provides only a temporary
comparative advantage. However, it should be recognized that the GDR has a qua-
lified stock of labor, which implies a comparative advantage due to the availability
of skilled labor.
Sectorial Structure
The sector structure of the GDR is biased in favor of agriculture and
manufacturing, and against services. Whereas 37.3 percent of total employment is
in manufacturing and energy and mining, this relation is 33. 1 in West Germany
(Table 4). The Federal Republic has reduced employment in manufacturing from 10
(1970) to 8.7 million (1989), while the GDR has increased it from 2.9 to 3.2 million
during the same time period. A more detailed picture of the sectorial structure of
the GDR is given in Table Al in the Appendix.16
Table 4 - Employment by Sectors in East Germany and West Germany, 1989 (shares
in percent)






























Source: DIW [1990a]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989]; Statistisches Bundesamt
[1989a]; own calculations.
Trade
The trade structure of the GDR is distorted, too. In 1989, about 46 percent
of its exports went to the COMECON countries (the figure for West Germany is
4.9; see Table 5). This is the result of the intra-bloc specialization philosophy of
the COMECON. Moreover, the GDR has followed an import substitution strategy
attempting to produce the product set of the world economy. Its structure in basic
industry, which historically used to be a complement to West Germany's structure
became more and more a replica of the West German mold, albeit on a less efficient
level. Exports of the GDR to the market economies are biased in favor of natural
resources and against manufactured and consumer goods.
The share of exports in the GNP for the GDR is estimated at 25 percent.
This is low for a small open economy. If the international division of labor were
given its full scope in the GDR, one would expect the GDR to have an export
share similar to that of countries of comparable size in terms of population, i. e. ,
2
in the range of 40-50 percent. This gap in the export shares indicates the magni-
tude of the transformation of the economy that has to be performed.
Previously the share amounted to 69. 4 percent. The data given in the text, are
the most recent official data and are based on more reliable methods of evaluation
because external trade coefficients have been brought close to realistic values.
Note that for the first five months of 1990, the percentage of exports to the
COMECON is 49.2.
2
For instance, the Netherlands have an export share of 54 percent.17
























































Source: Statistisches Amt der DDR [1990]; Statistisches Bundesamt [1990].
The GDR will experience a process of structural change similar to other Euro-
pean countries in the past thirty or forty years, only with less time available for
adjustments. Ailing industries, which are no longer competitive on the, international
markets, such as shipbuilding and parts of the steel and textile industry, will be
a policy problem. Pollution- and energy-intensive sectors will have to adjust. New
products satisfying international demand will have to be developed. The underde-
veloped service sector will have to expand considerably. The size of the structural
adjustment needed is the result of the distortions arising from central planning.
The impact of economic integration on intra-German trade flows will be deter-
mined by the principles of comparative advantage. In the short-term scenario the
GDR will have a locational advantage for industries with lower wages for qualified
labor; in the long run, its comparative advantage will result from the availability
of qualified labor, technical skills and, relative to agglomeration centers in the
West, the availability of space for the location of firms.
If plant-specific economies of scale and product qualities are relevant for the
market share of firms [ Helpman, Krugman, 1985], there is a tendency to increase
production at the original location. This would imply that West German firms, being
still able to reduce their average costs, have not yet reached their optimal produc-18
tion point. They also have an advantage because of their brand names. In the
context of the theory of market entry, West German firms may have the advantage
of an early market entry. These aspects point to a production bias for West Ger-
man firms, at least initially. Moreover, West German firms will acquire East Ger-
man units so that intra-German trade has to be explained as intra-firm trade. If
economies of scale are industry-specific or if they extend to the whole nation or
beyond, East German firms will eventually be integrated into the division of labor
among firms.
The economic integration of the two Germanies can be considered to fuse the
two endowment boxes OAO'B and O'CO*D where West Germany is relatively capital
abundant and East Germany relatively rich in labor (and land) as shown in Figure
2. The original points of specialization are M and N respectively, with k~ > k.-, k.
> k.*, and 1/r > l*/r*, where k. is the capital intensity of sector i, 1/r denotes the
wage/interest ratio and * stands for the GDR.
Figure 2 - Integration, Factor Endowment of the GDR and the FRG, and Trade
Capital
Labor
For a similar argument in another context, see Krugman and Venables [ 1990].19
b. The Growth Effect
In addition to the gains from integrating a capital-rich and labor-rich econo-
my, there will be growth effects arising for two reasons, namely the introduction
of an increased efficiency due to market incentives and due to capital accumula-
tion.
Incentives
Moving from a centrally planned economy with government ownership of the
means of production to a market economy will increase economic efficiency. Motiva-
tion of people will change. This holds for entrepreneurs, who where nonexistent so
far, as well as for workers, for whom pay and output will be more closely related.
Economic decisions will be delegated to the market and will be depoliticized, so that
efficiency should increase. Markets will allow gains from internal specialization; for
instance, markets deliver products at the right time (and the right place), so that
large inventories are no longer necessary and idleness of labor can be prevented.
























































































































Source: Barro [1987, p. 296]; Summers, Heston [1988].20
Low Capital Stock and Growth
Growth theory predicts, and historical experience confirms that countries with
similar technical skills and technology as well as a relatively low capital stock per
head have a lower output level initially, but also high growth rates [Barro, 1987].
Table 6 shows the growth rates of nine industrialized countries during the period
1950-1985 (see also Figure 3). Countries whose capital stock was destroyed by the
war experienced high growth rates (West Germany 7.5 percent, Italy 5.7 percent,
Japan 8. 1 percent) during the period 1950-1960. High growth rates were accompa-





























United Kingdom '^ST " "
1949-1953 1954-1958 1959-1963 1964-1968 1969-1973 1974-1978 1979-1985
(a) Five-year average of percentage changes over the previous year.
1 The growth rates of real GDP in the four industrialized countries for the period
1945-1949 are as follows: Japan 7.7, United Kingdom 0.6, and United States
-2.3. For Germany, the index of industrial production rose by 48.3 percent in
the same period. The index refers to the British and American zones only. The
figure given is the average of the three annual growth rates of 12 percent
(1946I-1947I), 56 percent (1947I-1948I), and 77 percent (19471V-1948IV). The
data for Germany are from Gundlach [1987, Table Al], for Japan from the Bank
of Japan [1966, Table 9], for the United Kingdom from Mitchell [1988, pp. 840-
841], and for the United States from the U.S. Department of Commerce [1976,
Table Fl-5].21
nied by a high investment ratio. On the other hand, countries with a capital en-
dowment not so much affected by the war had lower growth rates (United States
3.2 percent, United Kingdom 2.6 percent) and a lower investment ratio.
Analogy to West Germany in 1948
As a reminder, after the monetary reform of 1948 in West Germany, the index
of industrial production rose by 50 percent in the first five months on an annual
basis [ Wallich, 1955, p. 33], and annual growth rates of real GNP reached 20 per-
2 cent during the period 1949-1951. Admittedly, the situation in the GDR differs in
many respects from that of West Germany in 1948, but both cases are characterized
by a rich pool of qualified labor and a capital shortage: in 1948, because the ca-
pital stock was partly destroyed by the war; now, because the capital stock of
the GDR is obsolete in economic and ecological terms. It can be expected that the
eastern part of Germany will quickly catch up and, with the right kind of reforms,
two-digit real growth rates are likely.
Growth Scenarios
If West Germany's experience with high growth rates after the 1948 reform
can be partially applied to East Germany, then East Germany should be able to
reach 50 percent of the West German per capita income level in 2. 4 years and 70
percent in 6.9 years (Table 7). In order to arrive at these figures, the following
assumptions were made. The GDR starts from a low GNP of DM 200 bill. - roughly
one-tenth of West Germany's. This places income per head at roughly 33 percent of
4 West Germany's. For West Germany, a growth rate of 2 percent is assumed. In
the take-off scenario A, a real growth rate of East Germany of 25 percent in the
first year, 20 in the second and 15 in the third year is assumed, decreasing to
With capital accumulation, growth rates decline.
2
See Wallich [1955, p. 34]. GNP growth rates for West Germany: 1949, second
half 18.7 percent; 1950, first half 13.5 percent, second half 19.6 percent; 1951,
first half 20.6 percent, second half 9.5 percent. All data at constant 1936
prices; GNP-data not available prior to 1949.
The amount of destruction of German capital stock after the war is debated in
the literature [Gundlach, 1987].
4
In 1989 the GDR population was 26 percent of West Germany's.22
10 percent in the next two years and then 9, 8 and subsequently 7 percent. For
the outcome of this scenario as well as that of other scenarios the reader is re-
ferred to Table 7.
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6. The Political Economy of Transition
Both, the integration paradigm of merging two economies with a different fac-
tor endowment and the growth paradigm of market incentives and capital accumula-
tion, point to positive prospects in the medium and the long run. German unifica-
tion will be a growth stimulus. Economic integration of the two Germanies can be
viewed as an investment opportunity, a new frontier in the sense of Hansen [ 1955]
or a Schumpeterian event. The benefits expected from "Europe '92" will arise in a
similar way for the two Germanies, and integration benefits will be relatively high
because the potential for benefits is high due to large initial distortions. In the
transitional period, however, problems will appear.
The Restructuring of Industry
The core of the adjustment process is the restructuring of industry [ Siebert,
Schmieding, 1990]. Industry in the GDR was organized in 231 vertically and hori-
zontally integrated Kombinats of which 126 were directly controlled by the central23
branch ministries and the remaining 95 by regional authorities. The Kombinat encom-
passed basically the whole industrial branch with a clearly segmented market. The
Kombinat was protected against internal competition by governmental market deline-
ation; it was protected against competition from abroad by the philosophy of inter-
national specialization. Thus, the Kombinat represented a monopoly.
In the restructuring of the existing firms (Kombinats), three different as-
pects have to be distinguished: (i) legal independence, (ii) economic efficiency of
organizational units, and (iii) ownership. By law, all existing firms (roughly 8000)
have been declared legally independent. Thus, in a legal sense, the Kombinat has
already been broken up to some extent into subunits. However, the issue of crea-
ting an efficient organizational unit that can survive in the market is not yet sol-
ved. Thus, the existing units have-to be restructured by eliminating the produc-
tion of intermediate inputs that can be provided more cheaply by markets, by dis-
carding repair departments and by giving up social services like Kindergarten.
The organizational restructuring of the firms is linked to the issue of priva-
tization. All firms are now owned by the Treuhandanstalt, a government trust
agency. The role of the Treuhand is to privatize the firms and to eventually
return the financial wealth obtained from privatization either to the government or
to the people. Thus, the Treuhand should have a limited existence. However,
there is a risk that the Treuhand will become a super "machinery" of sectorial
policy which will be exposed to strong pressure in the political process.
In order to prevent such an outcome, the Treuhand should not be allowed to
invest in new projects or to use receipts from privatization to alleviate the ad-
justment process of ailing firms. Then financial resources will be wasted. More-
over, an institutional mechanism should be developed by which the individual firms
can dissociate themselves from the Treuhand, for instance, by pointing out a po-
tential investor. The Treuhand could then be forced to give its consent to the pri-
vatization of firms within a prescribed period, for instance, two months. An auc-
tion could also be used as a safeguard against selling a firm at too low a price.
Moreover, a lower limit for a sales price could be established. By means of such
institutional arrangements, one could make sure that the Treuhand will eventually
disappear.24
New firms
The reorganization of existing firms is only one aspect of the restructuring of
the East German economy. The restructuring of the East German economy must also
come about through the establishment of new firms, especially new and small firms.
The new firms must create new jobs in order to absorb the employees laid off as a
result of restructuring the inefficient existing firms.
The employment structure in the GDR is characterized by a relatively small
share of firms with fewer than 100 employees (Table 8). This category absorbs
only a small part of industrial employment. Consequently, the firms with more than
1000 employees account for a relatively large part of total employment. By con-
trast, in West German mining and manufacturing industries, the share of firms
with fewer than 100 employees is relatively large. It absorbs a higher share of to-
tal employment than in the GDR. The share of firms with more than 1000 employees
is small and accounts for only a relatively small part of total employment.
Table 8 - Structure of Employment by Firm Size in East Germany and West
Germany, 1987 (a)
Size of firms by number of
employees





































(a) GDR-data refer to the sector "Industrie", FRG-data to the sector "Energie-
und Wasserversorgung, Bergbau und Verarbeitendes Gewerbe".
Source: Institut fur Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung [ 1990].
The J-Curve of Output and Employment
In the transitional period, employment and industrial output will fall. Existing
firms are not competitive for a number of reasons, and the transition from a cen-25
trally planned economy will bring to light the hidden distortions and inefficiencies
in this economy. Unemployment, though it did not officially exist, was hidden and
will now become apparent. It will take time for new firms to come into existence.
Unemployment has risen to 272017 (July 1990), accounting for 2.8 percent of total
employment. For 656277 employees (6.8 percent of the work force), a short-time
work arrangement (Kurzarbeit) applies (Table 9).
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Source: Statistisches Amt der DDR [July 1990]; own calculations.
Labor Market Regulations
West German experience suggests that overall employment in the economy is
strongly influenced not only by the wage rate but also by the set of incentives or
disincentives for firms to hire labor. This includes the regulation of the labor mar-
ket, such as lay-off constraints and social plans for laid-off workers. The West
German system of labor market regulation can be interpreted as providing the wor-
kers with protection against external shocks to the total economy, as in the case
of an oil price shock, or against sectorial problems. When this institutional system
is extended to an economy in transition from central planning to a market system,
we must expect malfunctions. As one consequence, foreign direct investment will
be choked off. It is more adequate to develop a specific protection of the workers,
for instance, by subsidizing part of the wage for short-time work.26
Property Rights Uncertainty
Lay-off restraints in the labor market represent entry costs for foreign firms
and thus deter the inflow of capital. Costs of cleaning up soil contamination and
other vintage damages play a similar role by introducing an entry barrier which
makes a potential investment less attractive. Uncertainty about property rights is
another important aspect choking off investment from outside. One can only hope
that the decision to reinstate the previous owner will not lead to long legal
battles.
Market versus the Political Process
A caveat to the optimistic growth scenario described above should be men-
tioned. There is a risk that the economic integration of the two Germanies will not
be brought about by market forces but by the political process. There is no doubt
that it was the role of the political process to define institutional integration, for
instance, the negotiation of the treaty between the two Germanies. However, real
economic integration should be brought about by market forces. In the case of
converting the two currencies and wages, the political process has not relied on
market forces to determine the conversion rate for currencies and to find the equi-
librium wage, including the equilibrium wage structure. Now, there is a definite
risk that the political process will dominate the privatization of firms and sectorial
adjustment. Moreover, there is a strong political demand for the structural protec-
tion of the East German industry, for a slowed adjustment process and other types
of intervention. There is a tendency that the increase in wages is not steered by
market forces, especially by the increase in productivity, but by political bargain-
ing.
The aspirations of the inhabitants of the GDR are high, resulting in a poli-
tical demand for quick improvements in income, environmental quality, housing,
social security and physical infrastructure. There seems to be a belief that go-
vernment policy can solve these issues quickly. In this respect, the analogy to
1948 no longer holds. If these political demands are allowed to influence the course
If this should occur, one must envision the truncating of the uncertainty space.
This may partly be achieved by establishing well-defined laws which clearly spe-
cify an owner and which also clearly define the modes of compensation. A private
insurance against ownership titles of another potential owner (compare the deed
insurance in the United States) or a government insurance are examples.27
of events and if they dominate the market process, prices will be politicized. In
this case, structural change in the GDR will take place along similar lines to West
Germany's experience with the sectorial policy for ailing industries. Then, there is
the risk of the GDR turning into a "Ruhrgebiet" and then, there is no reason for
an optimistic scenario.
7. The Macroeconomic Outlook
The political economy of transition is interlinked to the macroeconomic aspects
of transition. These relate to the business cycle situation in both parts of Ger-
many, to government transfers and the role of monetary policy.
Split Business Cycle
The conversion of the East German Mark into D-Mark implies a transfer of
purchasing power to the East which can now be used to buy West German goods.
East Germans seem to favor West German products. Thus, aggregate demand for
West German products increases, creating excess demand and inflationary pressure
in the West. Due to a lack of demand for East German goods, we have a depres-
sion in the East. We thus have a split business cycle situation [ Flemig et al. ,
1990]. In the monetary union, monetary policy is no longer in a position to differ-
entiate between the business cycle situations in the two Germanies.
Transfers
Government transfers from West to East Germany will be needed for six dif-
ferent purposes:
- for building up the social overhead capital in the GDR,
- for improving the environmental situation, especially for cleaning up vintage
damages,
- for taking over the foreign debt,
- for contributing to the social security system in the transitional phase,
- for financing the budget deficit of the GDR, and
- for alleviating structural problems resulting from a lack of competitiveness of the
GDR industry and agriculture.28
Table 10 - Government Transfers from West to East Germany, 1990 and 1991
(bill. DM)
Transfers to the social security system
Old age pension scheme
Unemployment insurance
Health insurance
Transfers to the central government



















It is extremely difficult to estimate the amount of transfers needed. For social
overhead capital, the back-of-the-envelope calculation of the GDR capital stock in
social infrastructure amounts to roughly DM 530 bill, (see Table 3). Assuming that
a large part of the physical social infrastructure (buildings, roads) is physically
intact, maybe DM 200-300 bill, will have to be spent on physical infrastructure
over a ten-year period. Since physical infrastructure outlays require a long plan-
ning period, it is likely that only DM 10-15 bill, can be spent in 1991. It is ex-
tremely difficult to estimate the costs of correcting the environmental damages of
the past. They are not included in this calculation. Note that costs for abatement
of new facilities must be borne by the individual firms and therefore do not repre-
sent a cause of public transfer. The foreign debt amounts to DM 36. 3 bill. , repre-
senting a yearly burden of roughly DM 5 bill. Additional means are necessary for
the initial financing of the social security system (old age pensions, unemployment,
short-time work), at the level of DM 10 bill, for 1990 (Table 10). Subsidies for
firms in the GDR have been estimated at DM 22 bill, for 1990. For the financing of
the long-run sales contracts to the USSR, more than DM 2 bill, may be allocated in
1990.
The budget deficit of the GDR for 1990 is estimated at DM 63 bill. , with- ex-
penditures of DM 157 bill, and government revenues of DM 94 bill, (not including
capital transfers from West Germany; see Table 11). This means that transfers of
DM 41 bill, are needed in 1990, given the constraints on the ability of the GDR
government and the Treuhand to borrow. Government revenues in the GDR will
rely mainly on the value-added tax and on excise taxes. For 1991 a budget deficit
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Source: DIW [1990b]; own calculations for 1990 and 1991.
claims against the GDR firms or the Treuhand on their asset side; yet it is unclear
how certain these claims are. Moreover, the Treuhand has given credits to firms in
order to allow them to pay wages and to operate in the starting phase of the cur-
rency union. It is open to what extent these credits can be repaid.
Note that part of the government expenditures may be financed from priva-
tizing GDR firms and that part of the financial burden on the West German budget
can be financed by a reshuffling of expenditures and by an increase in tax reve-
nue due to economic growth. Eventually economic expansion in East Germany will
bring about an increase in tax revenue. It does not seem unrealistic that public
transfers will amount to DM 60 bill, in 1991. The overall German budget deficit can
be expected to reach DM 70 bill, in 1990 and DM 100 bill, in 1991. Note that the
West German budget deficit (federal, state, local, and social insurance) amounted
In 1989, the increase in tax revenue was DM 47 bill. However, this was influ-
enced by an increase in excise taxes (DM 10 bill. ), whereas the 1990 tax reform
will reduce the increase in tax revenue.30
to an average of roughly DM 25 bill, in the period 1985-1989. Of course, public
transfers may be interpreted as the cost of economic integration to the West Ger-
man taxpayer, but these costs will only arise in the transitional period. For the
country as a whole, especially after the transitional period, there will be benefits
from an increase in the division of labor within Germany.
Fiscal Expansion versus Monetary Restraint
There is strong political pressure for an increase in government expenditure
in the transitional period. This implies a demand stimulus and an expansionary fis-
cal policy. With transfers being largely financed by bonds, there is pressure for
the interest rate to rise from the demand side in addition to a supply-side increase
in the rate of return. Such an expansionary fiscal policy limits the maneuvering
space for the Bundesbank, and monetary policy may very well have to be restric-
tive in order to maintain price level stability. Thus the economic policy situation is
similar to the situation in the United States in the early eighties, and we may see
a conflict between an expansionary fiscal policy and monetary restraint.
8. International Implications
Capital Flows and the German Current Account
Private capital will flow into East Germany. There will also be public transfers
from the West to the East. Moreover, capital flows in Europe will be shifted to the
German union in the transitional period. Capital exports from West Germany, which
amounted to DM 118 bill, in 1989 (DM 120 bill, in 1988), will be reduced. It can be
expected that the real interest rate will be driven up because the marginal effici-
ency of capital in East Germany has increased and new investment opportunities
are opening up. This implies that borrowing will become more expensive elsewhere
in the world.
East Germany, being a net importer of capital in the transitional period, will
have a balance of trade deficit. The other side of the coin to the surplus in the
capital account (i.e., of net capital imports) is the trade deficit. The East German
trade deficit will be caused by the import of investment goods, but it will also
In the case of an oil crisis, the conflict would be aggravated.31
stem from the import of consumption goods which in turn are a function of the
purchasing power transferred due to the conversion of the GDR-Mark. East Ger-
many's negative trade balance implies that the overall German trade surplus and
German capital exports will be reduced.
The economic integration of the two Germanies will be a growth stimulus for
both Germanies, for Europe and for the world economy. With the German trade
surplus being reduced in the transitional period, Germany's demand for other
countries' exports will increase. Europe, the United States and other countries will
experience an increase in the demand for their exportables. The US trade deficit
will be reduced; at the same time capital inflows into the United States will be
smaller.
Exchange Rate Effects
From the supply side, there should be an appreciation of the D-Mark, assum-
ing that inflationary dangers due to conversion can be prevented. This appreci-
ation is due to a higher marginal efficiency of capital, i. e. higher rates of return
in East Germany, to a larger capital inflow (reduced capital outflow out of the
D-Mark area) and to an increased demand for the D-Mark; the appreciation is a
vehicle to bring about a reduction in the overall German trade surplus.
In a context of tradeables and non-tradeables, the D-Mark will appreciate as
well. In such a context the price for tradeables will be given by the world market;
the price for non-tradeables will rise for a number of reasons: The income transfer
to East Germany will increase the demand for non-tradeables, supply-side growth
will lead to an increase in income, again raising the demand for non-tradeables,
and infrastructure outlays in East Germany will increase the demand for non-trade-
ables. All these forces will raise internal absorption. Moreover, wages and conse-
quently production costs for non-tradeables will rise; price controls on non-trade-
ables will be lifted. At the same time, the transformation function between trade-
ables and non-tradeables will shift upward due to productivity gains and capital
inflow. The bias in the shift in the transformation curve will influence the oppor-
tunity costs of producing non-tradeables. This supply-side effect may counteract
the impact of the increase in absorption on the relative price of non-tradeables. It
would be sufficient for an increase in the opportunity costs of non-tradeables if
the shift in the transformation function is neutral or if it is biased in favor of
tradeables. Then the price of non-tradeables would rise from the production side.32
Under this condition, the relative price between non-tradeables and tradeables
rises, implying an appreciation of the real exchange rate.
In contrast to this long-run appreciation, the issue is how the futures mar-
kets evaluate the transitional problems in the GDR and the government transfers.
These expectations may imply that the D-Mark is weak for some time. The D-Mark
and the ECU have become stronger vis-a-vis the US dollar, but the D-Mark has
depreciated against the ECU and has been the weakest currency in the EMS basket
for some time (Figure 4).
German Integration and the EC
The German economic union should be embedded into the EC framework. This
means that East Germany should participate in the free flow of people, goods, ser-
vices and capital in the EC. With the EC applying institutional competition as the
basic strategy for integration, the transitional period of the German integration
process should not be too difficult from the European point of view. Moreover, in-
tegration benefits will be increased for the EC as a whole, with East Germany con-
stituting part of the larger market. Within the EC, investment in East Germany will
compete with investment in Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the argument that
non-EC-member countries would suffer from trade diversion should be taken seri-
ously, but not overrated. Such static effects of integration are small in quantita-
tive terms and will soon be outweighed by positive dynamic effects from which
nonmember countries will benefit, too.
In contrast to the short-run weakness of the D-Mark, the long-run tendency
for an appreciation of the D-Mark will put pressure on the EMS for a realignment.
Without realignment, the EMS countries will experience an increase in the interest
rate. This pressure for realignment will arise from the forces in the real economy
such as supply-side income growth, increased internal absorption and capital inflow
into Germany.
The additional pressure for realignment in the European monetary union may
make it more difficult to implement EMU more quickly. First, capital (portfolio as
well as risk capital) originating from nonmember countries will move into the EC
rather than into countries having a resource endowment similar to that of the
In the 28th to the 32nd calendar weeks (July 9 - August 12), the D-Mark has
come close to the 75 percent deviation line from the central rate. The ECU cen-
tral rate for the D-Mark is 2.04446 DM/ECU. The band is 2.0125-2.0764. The










11 21 26 31
Calendar weeks
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank [b]; Blick durch die Wirtschaft [May 15
August 25, 1990].34
GDR. Thus, the ECU will be expected to appreciate against the Dollar area, thus
contributing to a reduction in the imbalance in the current account of the United
States. Second, within the EC, capital will move from the Mediterranean countries
and the United Kingdom (the major host for non-EC risk capital during the eigh-
ties) to Continental Europe, particularly to the GMU area, thereby exerting depre-
ciation pressures upon the pound sterling. This may fuel inflationary tendencies
in the United Kingdom and impede the accession of the United Kingdom to the EMU
unless the United Kingdom succeeds in reducing internal absorption. One can ar-
gue from an economic point of view that the integration of all EC currencies into
the EMU will be delayed rather than accelerated due to the formation of a GMU.
Eastern Europe
With economic reforms taking place in Eastern Europe, the issue arises as to
what extent and in which forms the EC can open up to the Eastern European coun-
tries which are in the process of leaving the COMECON. We can envision free
trade agreements between the EC and individual countries for specific sectors simi-
lar to the 1973 free trade agreement with EFT A in manufacturing. Conceivably
some Eastern European countries may join the EFTA [Kostrzewa, Schmieding, 1989]
or form another economic union that is associated with the EC.
Economic integration of greater Europe involves a risk for the world economy
that there will be a move away from multilateralism towards the concept of the
world economy as a triad where strategic behavior may be a dominant character-
istic. It is somewhat ironic that the liberalization process in Eastern Europe has
discovered the merits of the free market and is moving away from a philosophy of
planned specialization among countries by international cooperation whereas new
theoretical, albeit naive, approaches in international economics from the United
States seem to suggest a new era of managed trade. Our aim must be to develop a
multilateral institutional arrangement for the world economy in which economic de-
cisions are decentralized.
Note that the attempt of the United Kingdom to bring down the interest rate may
be affected by the German situation.35
Appendix
Table Al - Structure of Employment by Sectors in East Germany and West Ger-
many, 1989





























(a) Latest available data of 1987. -
i.e. 17050. - (c) Latest available






















































































































total employment of 1987,
Calculated
does not take into
for total em-
account ap-
prentices. Including them would raise the number of total employment by 353000.
Source: DIW [1990a]; Staatliche Zentralverwaltung [1989]; Statistisches Bundesamt
[1989a]; own calculations.36
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